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This paper shows that labor market flexibility, measured by labor market standards and 
regulations, has two opposing effects on FDI inflows. Labor market regulations and 
standards decrease FDI inflows through the cost channel, but they increase FDI inflows 
through the productivity channel. Allowing for a non-linear relationship between 
different indicators of labor market flexibility and FDI inflows revealed that some degree 
of labor market standards and regulations may be attractive for foreign investors. Results 
strongly suggest that foreign investments to and from different countries and in different 
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I.  Introduction 
 
  Globalization of production and more open economies have expanded the decision 
range of profit maximizing firms on where to conduct business.  A large portion of the 
literature on foreign direct investments (FDI) has examined the various determinants of FDI 
location.  Some determinants of FDI location such as market size and distance are beyond the 
influence of policymakers in host countries.  However, some institutional determinants such 
as tax and investment incentive structures are more malleable.  One often overlooked 
institutional determinant is the flexibility of the labor market.  Labor market standards and 
regulations or any limitation placed on employment lead to labor market rigidity, which 
imposes costs on firms.  Hence, a profit maximizing firm would most likely want to locate in 
countries with more flexible labor markets.  In addition, flexible labor markets afford firms 
more freedom to adjust to prevailing economic conditions.  Therefore, it seems reasonable to 
assert that countries with rigid labor markets will have less FDI inflows.  While the 
mainstream literature argues that a highly regulated labor market impose additional cost on 
firms, which may deter FDI inflows, another strand of the literature has claimed that a highly 
regulated labor market may help enhance labor relations and increase labor productivity.  
Moreover, by providing job security, labor market standards and regulations can add to social 
stability.  And these attract FDI inflows.   
  While existing studies find either a positive or negative relationship between labor 
market flexibility and FDI inflows, no study has yet reconciled these two opposing effects, 
which I attempt to do in the current study.  First, I present the simple model of Dewit, Gorg, 
and Montagna (2003) to demonstrate that labor market flexibility can have two opposing 
effects on the expected profit of a multinational company (MNC), and thus on the motivation 
of the latter to invest in other countries.  I augment this simple model to show that the impact 2 
 
of labor market flexibility on FDI inflows is ambiguous and not clear cut positive or negative 
as suggested by previous studies.  Then, in my empirical specification, I allow for a non linear 
relationship between labor market flexibility and FDI inflows.  Previous studies have simply 
assumed that the relationship between the two is linear.  Hence, when a negative relationship 
is found, the immediate policy implication is that countries should reduce their labor market 
standards and regulations to increase flexibility and therefore attract more FDI.  However, 
when the possibility of non linear effects is recognized, it may reveal that some degree of 
standards and regulations is valued by foreign investors and that it is only high degrees of 
standards and regulations that repels FDI.  Thus, allowing for non linearities can help 
reconcile the two opposing effects of labor market flexibility on FDI inflows.   
Apart from the aforementioned, this study aims to contribute to the labor market FDI 
literature in other ways.  First, I use the International Labor Organization (ILO) Conventions 
that specifically pertain to hiring, at work, and firing standards to construct a simple measure 
of labor market flexibility.  This is in contrast to previous studies that have used either the 
total number of ILO conventions ratified by each country or ILO conventions on workers’ 
basic rights.  In addition, I use the labor market flexibility indexes constructed by the World 
Bank (WB) from a survey of business people in over 150 countries.  These indicators have not 
been previously used in the FDI labor market flexibility literature.  In contrast to previous 
studies that have used a single index to measure labor market flexibility, these indicators are 
disaggregated into hiring, hours at work, and firing regulations.  Thus, it is easy to distinguish 
which among these labor market regulations are actually significant to foreign investors.  I use 
the ILO conventions as a proxy for labor market standards and the WB indexes for labor 
market regulations.  All countries may decide to observe the same standards, but may 3 
 
implement them using different regulations.  Hence, WB indicators represent the actual 
market conditions faced by firms.   
Second, I verify whether the impact of labor market flexibility on FDI inflows matter 
more for developing than developed countries.  Previous studies have investigated this 
possibility, but on a limited number of countries.  I expanded the number of countries to test 
the robustness of previous studies’ findings.  In addition, most studies have pooled developed 
and developing countries, which I deem inappropriate.
1  Since FDI inflows to developed and 
developing countries have different motivations, this suggests that foreign investors may 
respond differently to labor market flexibility in different types of countries.   
Finally, I test which of the two countries’ MNCs – Japan or US, are more sensitive to 
labor market standards and regulations when choosing a host country for their FDI.  This may 
be important especially for countries aiming to attract FDI particularly from these two 
countries.  I disaggregate Japanese and US FDI by the recipient country level of development 
and by sector (manufacturing and non manufacturing).   
 
II.  FDI-Labor Market Flexibility Literature 
The literature on FDI determinants has been motivated by theories of international 
business, which are firm based; and by international trade, which is based on general 
equilibrium models.  The former points to the OLI framework developed by Dunning (1977, 
1981, and 2001), which argues that three conditions must be satisfied for FDI to occur: the 
firm must have both an ownership (O) and an internalization (I) advantage, and the host 
country must offer a locational (L) advantage.  Both ownership and internalization advantages 
depend on the firm, while locational advantage depends on the host country.  When potential 
                                                 
1 This was earlier shown by Blonigen and Wang (2004). 4 
 
countries are being considered by a MNC to host its FDI, the latter will choose based on the 
locational advantages offered by the former.   
The OLI framework complements the more formal general equilibrium models used to 
explain FDI location, which is based on factor endowment differences, market sizes, and trade 
costs.  The significance of these factors typically depends on whether FDI is of the horizontal 
or vertical type, as shown by general equilibrium models of Markusen (1984, 1995), Helpman 
(1984), Brainard (1993, 1997), Markusen and Venables (1995), Carr, Markusen, and Maskus 
(2001), and Markusen and Maskus (2001).   
The two approaches in studying FDI determinants have produced a plethora of 
empirical work on FDI determinants at the firm and country level.  These studies have 
considered various host country characteristics that may influence FDI inflows.
2  Figure 1 
presents a classification of the various determinants identified in the literature.  These factors 
may be divided into non policy and policy factors.  Non policy factors would include market 
size, distance, relative factor endowments, economic growth, and risk/uncertainty.  Policy 
factors meanwhile would include tax structure, investment incentives, product FDI 
restrictions, participation in trading agreements, and tariff regime.
3  An often overlooked 
policy factor is the labor market flexibility of the host country.  This factor can be considered 
vital in the choice of FDI host country because an entire production process (for the case of 
horizontal FDI) or a part of it (for the case of vertical FDI) is left to the hands of the host 
country labor force.   
 
 
                                                 
2 Chakrabarti (2001) have pointed out that some of these empirical studies form examples of ‘measurement 
without theory,’ as variables are searched for that show a significant influence on FDI and the relationship is 
explained ex post.  
3 See Whyman and Baimbridge (2006), Blonigen (2005), Nicoletti at al. (2003), and Yeyati, Stein, and Daude 
(2002) for a more detailed review of these factors.   5 
 
Figure 1.  Determinants of FDI 
 
Source:  Adopted by the author from Whyman and Baimbridge (2006)  
 
  According to Whyman and Baimbridge (2006), labor market flexibility refers to the 
degree to which labor market outcomes are determined by the operation of market forces free 
from rigidities and/or restrictions imposed by powerful actors such as the government, trade 
unions, and monopsony employers.  Thus, a perfectly flexible labor market would imply the 
absence of all hindrances to the free operation of market forces.  However, labor market 
standards, regulations, and non wage labor costs prevent labor market outcomes to be freely 
determined by market forces.  Figure 2 presents the various factors affecting labor market 
flexibility.   
The literature on labor market effects on FDI inflows has mostly focused on the 
impact of labor cost as part of the firm’s production cost.  These studies frequently use 
average wage rate
4 and unit labor costs as measures of labor costs.  While results of most 
 
                                                 
4 Manufacturing wage rate is mostly used. 
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Figure 2.  Determinants of Labor Market Flexibility 
 
Note:  *   See Appendix Table 1. 
Source:  Compiled by the author from various studies 
 
 
studies (Bellak et al. (2007), Fung et al. (2002), Cheng and Kwan (2000), Lucas (1993), 
Culem (1988), Schneider and Frey (1985), Flamm (1984)) conform to the mainstream 
literature that higher wages discourage FDI inflows, some studies found wages to be 
insignificantly and even positively related to FDI inflows (Owen (1982), Gupta (1983), 
Wheeler and Mody (1992)).  What is common in these studies is that labor cost is usually 
measured using wage labor only.  This may be reasonable since a large fraction of labor costs 
is composed of wage cost.  However, this neglects the fact that labor cost consists of both 
wage and non wage costs, where the latter includes hiring and firing costs.  Of the studies that 
have considered the non wage components of labor costs, the focus is mostly on European 
countries where non wage costs are high relative to other countries.  According to Whyman 
and Baimbridge (2006), the OECD Economic Outlook (2003), Buckley and Casson (1998), 
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and Moran (1998), a quarter to about one third of total labor costs in European countries are 
non wage costs.   In addition, more studies have focused on firing than hiring costs.  A 
possible reason for this is that hiring costs may be compensated by a reduction in wages in the 
long run.
5  However, the same adjustment cannot be made for firing costs.  The reason for this 
is that the firm may be faced with future uncertainties that may force it to unexpectedly lay 
off employees or even exit the market.  Since it is difficult to factor in all future uncertainties 
when a firm makes investment decisions, firing costs cannot really be planned ahead and 
therefore cannot be compensated with lower wages.  Similarly, for studies using labor market 
regulations as an indicator of labor market flexibility, more studies have focused on firing 
than hiring regulations.  There are likewise a considerable number of studies that have 
focused on regulations during the period of employment.  As seen from Figure 2, conditions 
during the duration of employment and firing regulations constrain the ability of firms to 
easily respond to changes in market forces. 
Bellak et al. (2007) included hiring costs (employers’ contributions to social security 
and to contractual and private benefit plans) in their measure of total labor costs.  Using a 
sample of selected European Countries, a negative and significant effect of total labor costs on 
FDI inflows was found.  However, it is hard to tell whether hiring costs really made a 
significant impact because it was not separated from total labor cost.  Haaland, Wooton, and 
Faggio (2003) theoretically demonstrated that firing costs, in particular severance payments, 
deters potential investment especially in risky industries.  Though the empirical test verified 
the theoretical result, this study cannot offer generalizations since the model was tested on 
only three countries, namely, Romania, Poland, and Bulgaria.  Covering a wider group of 
                                                 
5 However, if minimum wage laws exist, then the shifting of non wage costs to wages may only be partial. 
(OECD Economic Outlook, 2003) 8 
 
OECD countries, Lee (2003) used an EPL (employment protection legislation) index
6 to show 
that labor market regulations have a strong negative impact on FDI inflows.  However, the 
EPL index is limited since it simply averages the level of employment protection under a 
regular and a temporary contract.  Gorg (2005) focused on the impact of labor market 
flexibility on US FDI in 33 host countries.  He similarly found that countries with more liberal 
labor markets receive more FDI from the US.  The study likewise revealed that the impact of 
labor market restrictions on US FDI inflows is the same regardless of the host country’s level 
of economic development and economic risk/uncertainty.  The labor market flexibility 
indicator used in this study is a single index that is based on a survey of managers across 
countries conducted by the World Economic Forum and published in the Global 
Competitiveness Report.  The question asked on this survey is ‘whether hiring and firing 
practices are too restricted by the government or are flexible enough’.  An obvious drawback 
of this index is that it averages the effects of all hiring and firing practices.  Thus, it is 
uncertain which of the two drives the result.  Likewise, response to the survey question is 
likely to be subjective.   
Non wage labor costs and regulations are driven by policy objectives that are 
unrelated to FDI.  Most of these objectives arise with the aim of protecting the employee.  It is 
for this reason that labor market regulations are usually associated with EPL.  In addition, 
labor market regulations arise as outcomes of negotiations of contracts and incentives.  
Regardless of the exact reason why non wage costs and labor market regulations exist, they 
have important implications on the cross country distribution of FDI.  The mainstream 
literature suggests that non wage costs and labor market regulations negatively affect FDI 
inflows in a potential host country due to: (1) the decrease in MNC’s returns due to higher 
                                                 
6 From Nicoletti, Scarpetta, and Boylaud (1999) 9 
 
labor costs; and (2) the decrease in the capacity of the MNC to readily respond to supply and 
demand shocks. 
One strand of the literature uses labor standards as an indicator of labor market 
flexibility.  These studies usually use the ILO Conventions as indicators of labor market 
flexibility.  Forteza and Rama (2001) argued that ratified ILO Conventions is a reasonable 
proxy for the rigidity of a country’s labor market.  In addition, Freeman (1993)
7 claimed that 
these conventions reflect the ideal regulatory framework from an institutionalist perspective, 
where employees are considered weaker than employers.  Since ILO conventions restrict the 
ability of employers to decide on the terms and conditions of work, they are therefore seen as 
a source of labor market distortions.  A number of studies have used ILO Conventions as 
indicators of labor market flexibility, namely, Rodrik (1995), Kucera (2001, 2002), Cooke and 
Noble (1998), and Daude, Mazza, and Morrison (2003).
8  Results of these studies mostly 
show that low labor standards might be a hindrance, rather than an attraction, for foreign 
investors.  Moreover, these studies suggest that high labor standards facilitate human capital 
development and enhance political and social stability, which encourage FDI inflows.   
The foregoing shows that labor market flexibility has numerous facets, which makes 
the exact relationship between labor market flexibility and FDI inflows harder to predict.  In 
addition, the relationship between the two will be sensitive to the choice of labor market 
flexibility indicator used.  Thus, depending on the indicator chosen, labor market flexibility 
can have two opposing effects on FDI inflows, as illustrated in Figure 3.  On the one hand, 
labor market standards and regulations increase costs and decrease the ability of a firm to 
                                                 
7 Cited in Forteza and Rama (2001) 
8 Rodrik (1995) used the total number of ILO conventions ratified; Kucera (2001, 2002), Cooke and Noble 
(1998), and Daude et al. (2003) used an index based ILO Conventions 87 (Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Rights to Organize) and 98 (Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining).   10 
 
respond to market changes, which deters FDI.  On the other hand, labor market standards and 
regulations enhance labor productivity, which attracts FDI.   
 
Figure 3.  The Impact of Labor Market Flexibility on FDI Inflows 
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III.  Theoretical Framework 
I use the simple theoretical model developed by Dewit et al. (2003) to demonstrate 
how labor market flexibility in potential FDI host countries can affect the choice of the MNC 
on where to locate.  There are two types of countries in the model, home and foreign, which 
are assumed to have the same production costs.  Dewit et al. (2003) argued that the symmetric 
cost assumption allows the model to focus on employment regulations as the sole motivation 
for location choice of the firm.  However, under this assumption, there will be no motivation 
for vertical FDI, which mainly occurs to take advantage of differences in production costs 
between home and foreign country.  Therefore, I slightly altered the assumption of the model 
by assuming that the choice of the MNC is among potential FDI host countries.  This would 
accommodate both horizontal and vertical FDI.  Therefore, even if production costs are 
assumed the same between the potential host countries, if FDI is of the vertical type, then the 11 
 
choice must be between countries that have the same lower production costs than the FDI 
source country.   Furthermore, I assume that the profit maximizing MNC in the home country 
has already recognized that it is optimal for it to invest in a foreign country, where horizontal 
FDI is motivated by market access and vertical FDI is motivated by cost advantage.   
The firm is a monopolist that chooses among countries, C1 ,…, Cn, as the host country 
for its FDI.  There are two periods in the model.  Demand in period 1 is known by the firm for 
certain, but demand in period 2 has some degree of uncertainty.   Therefore, the inverse 
demand curves in periods 1 and 2 are given by p1 = a   q1 and p2 = a – q2 + u, respectively, 
where pt and qt are the price and quantity in period t (t=1, 2), a is a positive constant and u is 
a stochastic demand component, with mean E(u) = 0 and variance v.  Since the firm faces 
uncertainty in period 2, it values labor market flexibility.  In the event of a decrease in 
demand in period 2, it has to cut its production, which means it may have to resort to cutting 
employment.  Similarly, when demand increases in period 2, the firm wants to increase its 
production, which means it may want to increase employment.  In either case, hiring and 
firing of employees can be costly, notably when the labor market is rigid.   
The total variable cost in location i (i=1,…, n) is given by: 
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where ci is the marginal cost of production in location i, which is assumed to be the same in 
both periods.  λi is the degree of labor market inflexibility in location i.  The higher λi is, the 
more stringent the labor market in location i is.  When the firm decides to alter its output in 
period 2,  0 1 2 > − q q ; otherwise,  0 1 2 = − q q .  Thus, the second term in (1) reflects the 
adjustment cost when output level is changed.   
The fixed set up cost in location i is given by: 12 
 
(2)  FCi = φ + δi,  
where φ is a constant fixed cost faced by the MNC regardless of the location chosen and δi is 
a location specific fixed cost.   
To maximize expected total profits, E(Π) = Π1 + E(Π2), the MNC chooses its optimal 
output in location i in each period given by: 
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1 2 is decreasing in λi.  If location i has an inflexible labor market (high λi), the 
MNC optimally chooses to adjust its period 2 output by a small amount in the face of 
uncertainty.   
The maximized expected profit is given by: 
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This implies that the MNC will have greater expected profits when it chooses the location 
with more flexible labor market (low λi).  Thus, more FDI is expected to flow in location i as 
the expected profits in location i increase.   
The foregoing illustrates how labor market regulations can constrain the decision of 
firms to respond readily to changes in the economic environment.  A firm experiencing an 13 
 
unexpected decrease in demand may decide to lay off workers.  However, doing so is not 
costless and may not be an easy process.  The firm has to deal with regulations on notice 
period and severance payments.  Similarly, when a firm unexpectedly experiences an increase 
in demand, even if it wants to increase employment of labor in response to the market change, 
hiring of new employees or increasing work hours will come at a cost.  Hence, a MNC would 
have to take into account the state of the labor market in their choice of host country.  When 
labor markets have stringent regulations, they are considered less flexible since they cause 
firms to slow down the reallocation of their resources in response to market changes, which in 
turn can be costly for firms.   
What the preceding does not show, however, is that labor standards and regulations, 
though restrictive from the point of view of firms, exist to protect the interest of workers.  For 
instance, if there were no restrictions on work hours and overtime pay, a firm can just require 
its existing employees to work for longer hours to meet an increase in demand for its good 
and just pay the regular hourly wage for the additional hours of work.  Beyond some number 
of work hours, however, this practice may be considered exploitative.  In addition, labor 
standards may be established to promote long lasting work relationships and provide job 
security.  For instance, firms may respond to the rigidity in the labor market by training 
employees in various functions, which increases within firm or internal flexibility.  This 
reduces the cost associated with hiring and firing of workers.  Moreover, if firms provide 
more employment protection, they may find that their workers are more loyal and hard 
working.  High labor standards may likewise encourage human capital development.  An 
example is the ILO Convention on paid educational leave, which increases the cost of 
employers, but enhances human capital development.  Social stability may likewise result 
from the job security that certain labor standards and regulations provide.  Therefore, labor 14 
 
regulations and standards can actually have a positive impact on FDI inflows by enhancing 
the aggregate labor productivity of a country.  If this is the case, it is possible for certain labor 
market regulations and standards to decrease the marginal cost of production in location i, that 
is, c can be a negative function of λ.  Thus, (5) and (6) can be alternatively written as 



















(6’)  0  
)] 2 ( 2 [
) ( '
2






















.   
where c’(λ) < 0.  The first term in (6’) represents the positive impact of labor market 
regulations and standards on the MNC’s expected profits due to increased labor productivity 
that decreases the marginal cost of production.  The second term, meanwhile, represents the 
negative impact of labor market regulations and standards on the MNC’s expected profits due 
to adjustment costs incurred by the firm when it changes its production decisions as a result of 







 is ambiguous, depending on which effect 
dominates.  Based on the foregoing, I hypothesize that labor market flexibility can influence 
the cross country differences in FDI inflows through two channels: costs and productivity.   
 
Hypothesis:  An increase in labor market inflexibility will decrease FDI inflows through 
the cost channel and will increase FDI inflows through the productivity channel.    
 
IV.  Empirical Methodology and Data  
To empirically test whether labor market flexibility has a significant impact on cross 
country differences in FDI inflows, the following equation will be estimated: 
(7)  log (FDIji) = α + βLMi + γXi + εji ,   15 
 
where FDI inflows from source j to country i is regressed on a measure of labor market 
flexibility (LM) of country i and other country i characteristics, Xi, known to affect FDI 
inflows.  β is the coefficient of interest and ε is a random error term.  Stated in this manner, 
(7) is a reduced form representation of the FDI labor market flexibility relationship.  Whether 
labor market flexibility has a positive or negative impact on FDI inflows depends on the net 
impact of the former on the expected profits of the MNC.   
  Equation (7) assumes a linear relationship between labor market flexibility and FDI 
inflows.  When labor market standards and regulations are used as indicators of labor market 
flexibility and when a negative effect on FDI inflows is found, the outright conclusion is that 
labor market flexibility should be increased by reducing standards and regulations in order to 
attract more FDI inflows.  And when a positive relationship is found, the explanation given 
for the seemingly surprising result is that labor market standards and regulations increase 
labor productivity.  Thus, standards and regulations should be encouraged in order to attract 
more FDI inflows.  Note that when only a linear relationship is assumed, the relationship 
between labor market flexibility and FDI inflows could only be either positive or negative at 
all levels of labor market standards and regulations.   
The theoretical model presented in the preceding section recognizes that labor market 
standards and regulations may reduce the marginal cost of production by increasing aggregate 
labor productivity.  At the same time, labor standards and regulations increase the total 
variable cost faced by a MNC when an adjustment needs to be done in response to market 
uncertainties.  To allow for these two possible channels, I add a squared term for the labor 
market flexibility indicator.  Hence, equation (7) becomes 
(7’)  log (FDIji) = α + β1LMi + β2LMi
2 + γXi + εji. 
There are several possibilities in the signs of β1 and β2.   16 
 
First, β1 > 0 and β2 < 0.  This implies that labor market standards and regulations 
increase FDI inflows at a decreasing rate.  If this case holds, then this would suggest that 
some degree of labor market standards and regulations is helpful in attracting FDI inflows.  
But higher levels of regulation will be too costly and eventually ward off investors.  This case 
may likewise suggest that the productivity effect of standards and regulations can have a 
diminishing effect on FDI inflows.   
Second, β1 < 0 and β2 > 0.  This implies that labor market standards and regulations 
decrease FDI inflows at a decreasing rate.  If this case holds, the marginal increase in costs 
becomes smaller as standards and regulations increase; that is, the negative impact of 
regulations will have a diminishing effect on FDI inflows.   
Third, β1 < 0 and β2 < 0.  This implies that labor market standards and regulations 
decrease FDI inflows at an increasing rate.  If this case holds, then the cost channel dominates 
the productivity channel.   
Fourth, β1 > 0 and β2 > 0.  This implies that labor market regulations increase FDI 
inflows at an increasing rate.  If this case holds, then the productivity channel dominates the 
cost channel.     
The aforementioned cases are illustrated in Figure 4.  The four cases suggest that the 
impact of labor market regulations on FDI inflows depends on whether a country has high or 
low levels of standards or regulations and on which of the two channels is more dominant.   
 













On the choice of labor market flexibility indicator, I depart from previous studies in 
two ways.  First, I do not use the total number of ILO conventions or number of ILO 
conventions pertaining to workers’ basic rights ratified by each country as an indicator of 
LMF.  Using the total number of ILO conventions ratified as an indicator of LMF is 
inappropriate since the conventions cover a wide variety of employment regulations. 
I choose only ILO conventions that specifically pertain to hiring, at work, and firing 
standards.  Appendix Table 1 summarizes the conventions classified under each category.   
I do not aggregate the conventions covering these three categories in order to distinguish 
which among the three is most important for foreign investors.  Moreover, rather than simply 
obtaining the number of conventions ratified by each country under each category, I consider 
the number of conventions ratified by each country i relative to the maximum possible 
number of regulations for each category k (where k = hiring, at work, firing standards) for 
each year t, that is, 
   k indexit = 
t
it
k Category for ons Ratificati ILO of  umber Total
k Category for ons Ratificati ILO of  umber
) (
) (
 X  100. 
The larger the index is, the greater are the number of conventions ratified by a country.  For 
instance, in 1992, 21 ILO Conventions were classified under at work category.  Of these 
conventions, Australia has ratified only one.  Thus, at work index for Australia for 1992 is 
(1/21) x 100 or 4.80.  In 1993, an additional convention under at work category was 
introduced,
9 but Australia did not ratify the convention.  Hence, at work index for Australia in 
1993 went down to (1/22) x 100 or 4.50.  Thus, if a convention is not ratified by a country in a 
given year, the index will decrease for the country.  If no convention is introduced by the ILO 
in a given year, then the indexes remain the same for all countries.  An exception happens 
                                                 
9 Convention No. 174 (Prevention of Major Industrial Accidents) 18 
 
when a country denounces a previously ratified convention.  For instance, Brazil ratified 
Convention No. 158 (Termination of Employment) in 1982, but denounced the convention in 
1996.  Hence, though no convention was ratified in 1996, the firing index for Brazil decreased 
from 20 in 1995 to 0 in 1996.   
Second, I use various labor market flexibility indicators obtained from the Doing 
Business Database of the World Bank (WB).  The indicators focus on the regulation of 
employment, specifically the hiring and firing of workers and the rigidity of work hours.  
They were based on a survey that started in 2003, which was conducted on various firms in 
over 150 countries.  To make the data comparable across countries, the survey was designed 
to reflect the employment regulation enforcement across countries.  Thus, in contrast to the 
ILO indicators which represent the labor standards countries agreed in principle to observe, 
the WB indicators represent the actual regulations faced by investors in different countries.  
Specific assumptions about the worker and the business were provided in the survey and 
respondents were asked to answer based on the given assumptions and the existing labor 
regulations in the country.
10  Hence, subjectivity of responses is eliminated, in contrast to 
other indicators of labor market flexibility.  Out of the survey, the database provides a rigidity 
of employment index (REI), which is a weighted average of the difficulty of hiring index 
(DHI), rigidity of hours index (RHI), and difficulty of firing index (DFI).  Higher values of 
the indexes indicate more rigid regulation.  A summary of the components of the indexes is 
provided in Appendix Table 2.   
Compared to single aggregate indexes used in previous studies, the disaggregation of 
the ILO Conventions and the WB’s rigidity of employment index into different components is 
appealing.  The disaggregated indicators enable one to see whether the impacts of the 
                                                 
10 A copy of the actual questionnaire can be downloaded from http://www.doingbusiness.org/Methodology/. 19 
 
different categories of standards and regulations are equally significant for foreign investors.  
However, as with any other indicator, both sets of labor market flexibility indicators have 
drawbacks.   
Although the ILO actively monitors the observance of the ratified conventions, it does 
not have the legal power to penalize a nation from not observing a convention that it has 
ratified.  The most that it can do is to rely on moral suasion.  Hence, a limitation of using the 
ILO conventions as indicators of labor market flexibility is that they may just measure the 
latter as stated on paper and not necessarily in practice.  Another drawback of the ILO 
Conventions is that whether countries ratify a convention or not may depend on its level of 
economic development.  Appendix Table 3 summarizes the percentage of developed and 
developing countries with ILO and WB labor market flexibility indicators above and below 
the mean values of these indicators.  The table reveals that a greater proportion of developed 
countries have ILO indexes above the mean.  This implies that developed countries generally 
ratify more conventions than developing countries.  This is most apparent for the firing index 
where 71 percent of developed countries have an index above the mean, while only 38 percent 
of developing countries have an index above the mean.   
A more preferred indicator of labor market flexibility is one that does not only capture 
labor regulations as stated on paper, but which captures their enforcement and effect on firms’ 
operations as well.  The labor market flexibility indicators from the WB satisfy this 
characteristic.  In addition, as seen in Appendix Table 4, compared to the ILO indexes, there 
seem to be no apparent correlation between a country’s level of development and the WB 
indexes.
11  Hence, in these aspects the WB indicators are preferred over the ILO indicators.  A 
                                                 
11 Although among the ILO indicators, only firing standards seem to be highly correlated with a country’s level 
of development.  Correlation between the developing country dummy and firing standards is  0.39, which imply 
that developing countries generally have lesser firing standards than developed countries.   20 
 
drawback of using the WB labor market flexibility indicators, however, is that the values of 
the indexes do not change for any country for the period covered by the survey.
12   
I proceed with the aforementioned limitations in mind.  Both sets of labor market 
flexibility indicators will be used to estimate the impact of labor market flexibility on FDI 
inflows.  Fixed effects technique is used to estimate equations (7) and (7’) when the ILO 
indexes are used as indicators.  Fixed effects estimation eliminates the effect of time invariant 
omitted variables.  Such estimation method can be used since the ILO indexes vary for 
countries for the period 1990 2005.  However, fixed effects estimation cannot be used when 
the WB indexes are used as indicators since the indexes are time invariant.  Thus, when using 
the WB indexes, data is pooled across years for all 165 countries, where each country year 
observation is treated as a single observation.  Since I am only able to estimate a simple cross 
country relationship between FDI inflows and labor market flexibility when using the WB 
indexes, there is always a risk that the correlations I document are spurious.  To address this 
concern, I include various variables that the literature suggests are correlated with FDI 
inflows.  This lessens the possibility that the LMF indicators will capture the effect of omitted 
variables.  I likewise included dummy variables for each year to account for year effects.
13  
I consider three sources (j) of FDI, namely, the rest of the world (ROW), Japan, and 
the United States.  A cursory inspection of the FDI data shows that all countries included in 
                                                 
12 Statistically, this is a limitation.  In reality, not much can really be done about it since labor market regulations 
rarely change from one year to another.  Since many regulations have to be passed into law before being 
implemented, it is necessarily expected that regulations will not change on an annual basis.   
13 Based on existing literature, the following explanatory variables are included in the estimations: wage and its 
square, GDP per capita and its square, trade as a percent of GDP, inflation rate, tax on goods and services, labor 
force participation rate, population, literacy rate, exchange rate, external debt as a percentage of GDP, capital 
account openness index, dummy variable whether the form of government is democratic or not, corruption 
index, manufacturing value added (included in estimation for the manufacturing sector), distance from US 
(included in estimation for US FDI), distance from Japan (included in the estimation for Japanese FDI), and 
dummy variables for membership in different preferential trading agreements (AFTA, NAFTA, COMESA, 
MERCOSUR, CARICOM, EU).  Variance inflation factor was checked for each regression to ensure that there 
is no serious multicollinearity among the explanatory variables.  Robust standards errors are also used to 
minimize the problem of heteroskedasticity.    21 
 
the study have received FDI inflows from the ROW in the years covered by the study.  
However, not all countries have received FDI from Japan and US.  Therefore, Tobit 
estimation is the appropriate method of estimation when considering FDI coming from US 
and Japan.  Appendix Table 5 presents the description of variables and their corresponding 
sources.  Appendix Table 6 presents the summary statistics of these variables.  
 
V.  Results 
Table 1A presents the results of the estimations using the constructed ILO indexes as 
the labor market flexibility indicators.   Panel A lists the coefficients for the sample of all 
countries.  Panels B and C, meanwhile, contain the coefficients for the developed and 
developing countries samples, respectively.   
  Panel A reveals that countries with more hiring and at work standards generally 
receive more FDI inflows.  A 10 unit increase in hiring and at work indexes increases FDI 
inflows by about 7 11 and 14 percent, respectively, as seen in columns (1), (2), and (4).  
There is no discernable non linear relationship between FDI inflows and the ILO standards.  
In addition, firing standards are statistically insignificant in affecting FDI inflows.  The results 
for the developed countries sample are very similar to the pooled sample as seen in Panel B.  
Hiring and at work standards are statistically significant, but firing standards are not.  A 10 
unit increase in hiring and at work indexes will increase FDI inflows to developed countries 
by about 11 19 and 16 percent, respectively, as seen in columns (1), (2), and (4).   
The result for the developing countries sample is quite different as revealed in Panel 
C.  Hiring standards are only weakly statistically significant in affecting FDI inflows, while at 
work and firing standards are statistically significant in explaining FDI inflows.  A 10 unit 
increase in at work index increases FDI inflows by about 14 percent, as seen in columns (2). 22 
 
Table 1A.  Impact of Labor Market Standards on FDI Inflows from the Rest of the World 
 
                       Notes:  Values in ( ) are standards errors.  ** and * indicate significance at 5% and 10% level, respectively.   
                 Coefficients estimates of other explanatory variables appear in Appendix Table 7.   
 
   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)















No. of Observations 2640 2640 2640 2640 2640 2640
F-statistic 17.54 18.08 17.34 17.08 17.59 16.88
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.2017 0.2066 0.1998 0.2019 0.2067 0.2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)















No. of Observations 656 656 656 656 656 656
F-statistic 10.68 10.86 10.28 10.41 10.54 9.98
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.3920 0.3959 0.3829 0.3930 0.3959 0.3830
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)















No. of Observations 1984 1984 1984 1984 1984 1984
F-statistic 11.56 11.94 11.55 11.26 11.61 11.40
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.1823 0.1870 0.1821 0.1826 0.1870 0.1844
Labor Market    
Flexibility Indicator
Labor Market    
Flexibility Indicator
Labor Market    
Flexibility Indicator
Panel A.  All Countries
Panel B.  Developed Countries
Panel C.  Developing Countries23 
 
A non linear relationship is apparent between firing standards and FDI inflows.  Developing 
countries with more firing standards will generally attract more FDI inflows such that a 10 
unit increase in the firing index will increase FDI inflows by about 15 percent, as seen in 
column (6).  However, when firing standards reach a certain level, FDI inflows will start to 
decrease.  Developing countries with firing index below 32 will find that FDI inflows will still 
increase if firing standards are increased.
14  However, countries with firing index above 32 
may find that increasing firing standards any further will decrease their FDI inflows. Of the 
124 developing countries in the sample, only 19 countries have firing index above 32.   Thus, 
my results suggest that most developing countries can still increase their firing standards sans 
the fear of repelling FDI inflows.
15   
The preceding results suggest that countries with higher labor market standards 
generally receive more FDI inflows, suggesting that MNCs value labor market standards in 
host countries.  Moreover, results show that not all labor market standards have the same and 
significant effects on FDI inflows to developed and developing countries.   
  Table 1B presents the results of the estimations using the WB indexes as the labor 
market flexibility indicators.  Again, Panels A, B, and C list the results for the pooled, 
developed, and developing countries samples, respectively.   
  Panel A, column (1) shows that based on the aggregate index – rigidity of 
employment, labor market regulations do not have a significant impact on FDI inflows.  
However, when this index is disaggregated into its components, regulations on work hours 
and firing have statistically significant impact on FDI inflows, as seen in columns (3) and (4).   
 
                                                 
14 This is calculated as (−β1/2β2).    
15 For instance, the following developing countries have firing index below 32:  Angola, Bangladesh, Cambodia, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Guatemala, Mongolia, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Vietnam; and the following have firing index 
above 32: Mexico, Madagascar, and Zambia.   24 
 
Table 1B. Impact of Labor Market Regulations on FDI Inflows from the Rest of the World 
 
 
          Notes:  Values in ( ) are standards robust errors.  ** and * indicate significance at 5% and 10% level, respectively.   
   Coefficients estimates of other explanatory variables appear in Appendix Table 7.   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)




















No. of Observations 2640 2640 2640 2640 2640 2640 2640 2640
F-statistic 39.32 38.94 0.3799 0.3908 38.39 37.91 37.53 39.19
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.3147 0.3153 0.3162 0.3171 0.3163 0.3153 0.3162 0.3177
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)




















No. of Observations 656 656 656 656 656 656 656 656
F-statistic 51.27 50.08 51.87 50.63 52.74 49.27 57.04 47.69
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.6420 0.6417 0.6425 0.6431 0.6577 0.6418 0.6983 0.6488
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)




















No. of Observations 1984 1984 1984 1984 1984 1984 1984 1984
F-statistic 27.07 27.01 26.75 27.65 26.58 26.32 27.05 27.22
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.2650 0.2635 0.2624 0.2697 0.2662 0.2635 0.2726 0.2715
Labor Market              
Flexibility Indicator
Labor Market              
Flexibility Indicator
Labor Market              
Flexibility Indicator
Panel A.  All Countries
Panel B.  Developed Countries
Panel C.  Developing Countries25 
 
A 10 unit increase in the rigidity of hours index will increase FDI inflows by 2 percent, while 
a 10 unit increase in the difficulty of firing index will decrease FDI inflows by 2.4 percent.   
When a non linear relationship is allowed between the labor market flexibility 
indicators and FDI inflows, the rigidity of employment index gains statistical significance as 
seen in column (4).  A 10 unit increase in the rigidity of employment index deceases FDI 
inflows by about 8 percent.  However, when the index is disaggregated into its components, 
there is no apparent non linear relationship between FDI inflows and the disaggregated 
indexes as seen in columns (6) – (8).
16   
Panel B, columns (1) (4) reveal that when only a linear relationship is allowed 
between labor market flexibility and FDI inflows to developed countries, the former is 
insignificant in explaining the latter.
17  A statistically significant relationship between labor 
market flexibility and FDI inflows in developed countries is strongly evident only when non 
linear relationship is allowed, as seen in columns (5) and (7).  A 10 unit increase in the 
rigidity of employment index decreases FDI inflows by about 40 percent, and this can be 
attributed to the rigidity of hours.  A 10 unit increase in the rigidity of hours index decreases 
FDI inflows by about 45 percent.  Thus, MNCs are discouraged to invest in developed 
countries with rigid work hour regulations, but are indifferent as regards hiring and firing 
regulations.
18   
Panel C shows that a 10 unit increase in the rigidity of employment index decreases 
FDI inflows to developing countries by about 3 10 percent, as seen in columns (1) and (5).  
Among the components of the aggregate index, the difficulty of hiring index is marginally 
significant, as seen in column (2).  Both the rigidity of hours and difficulty of firing indexes 
                                                 
16 Squared term for difficulty of firing is insignificant.   
17 Difficulty of firing index in column (4) is only marginally significant. 
18 Firing regulations are only weakly statistically significant and the economic impact is quite small – 3 percent, 
as seen in column (4).   26 
 
are strongly statistically significant.  A 10 unit increase in the rigidity of hours index will 
increase FDI inflows by about 14 percent as seen in column (7), while a 10 unit increase in 
the difficulty of firing index will decrease FDI inflows by about 3 9 percent, as seen in 
columns (4) and (8).   
The preceding results show that it is important to look not only at aggregate indexes, 
as important relationships may be concealed when analysis is based only on an aggregate 
index.  For instance, the negative relationship found for the rigidity of employment index and 
FDI inflows to developing countries may give an impression that all types of labor market 
regulations should be reduced in developing countries in order to attract more FDI inflows.  
However, once the index is disaggregated into its components, only firing regulations have a 
negative impact on FDI inflows.  In fact, regulations on work hours have a positive impact on 
FDI inflows up to a certain limit.  Countries with rigidity of hours index below 40 can still 
increase their work hour regulations and still have an increase in their FDI inflows.  However, 
countries with rigidity of hours index above 40 may find their FDI inflows decreasing if 
regulations on work hours are further increased.  Of the 124 developing countries in the 
sample, 91 countries have rigidity of hours index below 40.  My results imply that a great 
majority of developing countries can still increase their work hour regulations and still 
increase their FDI inflows.   
Regulations on work hours may improve the productivity of workers, which may 
explain the positive impact of the rigidity of hours index on FDI inflows.  This suggests that 
though regulations constrain work hours in developing countries, this is not necessarily seen 
by foreign investors as a hindrance to their operations.  Making employees work beyond a 
certain number of hours may actually decrease their productivity.  This likewise suggests that 
foreign investors do not necessarily gravitate towards countries where workers are made to 27 
 
work for unreasonable number of hours.
19  Regulations on firing, however, may slow down 
the operations of firms, especially when an adjustment on the employment level needs to be 
made, which explains the negative relationship between the difficulty of firing index and FDI 
inflows.  These results are consistent with the theoretical model presented in the previous 
section.  On the one hand, labor market regulations decrease the marginal cost of production 
by increasing labor productivity, which increases FDI inflows.  On the other hand, labor 
market regulations increase the adjustment costs faced by a firm when it decides to change its 
employment level, which deters FDI inflows. 
Similar to the estimations using ILO indexes, results show that not all labor market 
regulations have the same and significant effects on FDI inflows to developed and developing 
countries.  Based on the rigidity of employment index, labor market regulations have a larger 
negative impact on developed than developing countries.  A 10 unit increase in the rigidity of 
employment index will reduce FDI inflows to developed countries by about 40 percent and 
only about 10 percent for developing countries.  This is in contrast to the prediction of 
Haaland et al. (2003) that labor market flexibility should have a greater impact in developing 
than developed countries.  A possible explanation for this is that worker compensation is in 
general more costly in developed than developing countries.  Moreover, allowing for non 
linear effects is important, as it may reveal additional information that is concealed when the 
relationship is just assumed to be linear.  For instance, the positive impact of work hour 
regulations on FDI inflows to developing countries is only evident when a non linear 
relationship is specified.   
                                                 
19 An example is the issue about a textile factory in India where laborers are made to work from dawn until late 
in the evening.  This factory was exposed to produce garments for the American retail clothing chain GAP Inc.  
As a response, the latter severed all its ties with suppliers that are known to manufacture garments in deplorable 
working conditions.  28 
 
The results in Tables 1A and 1B are very suggestive.  While labor market standards 
generally increase FDI inflows, labor market regulations have a greater tendency of reducing 
FDI inflows.  These imply that foreign investors prefer to invest in countries with some 
degree of labor market standards as these may signal higher aggregate labor productivity.  
However, foreign investors may be wary of some labor market regulations because these 
translate to actual costs.  These suggest that developing countries need not “race to the 
bottom” in order to attract FDI inflows.  What developing countries need to do is to find a 
proper balance of labor market standards and regulations such that these can increase labor 
productivity, but at the same time not becoming too rigid and costly from the point of view of 
MNCs.  
Among the other explanatory variables, wage, GDP per capita, inflation rate, trade, 
tax, exchange rate, labor force participation rate, literacy rate, population, capital account 
openness, external debt, and corruption index appear significant in explaining FDI inflows, 
depending on the estimation technique used.  Results are shown in Appendix Tables 7A and 
7B.   
Next, equations (7) and (7’) are estimated for FDI inflows from Japan and US. Tables 
2A and 2B display the results using ILO and WB indexes as labor market flexibility 
indicators, respectively.  Table 2A, Panel A reveals that the decision of MNCs from both 
Japan and US to invest in other countries is affected by the potential host countries’ labor 
market standards.  It is noticeable though that Japanese MNCs are more sensitive to most 
labor market standards as revealed by the larger magnitude of effects on Japanese FDI 
inflows.  In general, FDI inflows from Japan and US decrease as hiring and at work standards 
increase, but FDI inflows increase as firing standards increase.  
 29 
 
Table 2A.  Impact of Labor Market Standards on FDI Inflows from Japan and US 
 
Notes:  Values in ( ) are standards errors.  ** and * indicate significance at 5% and 10% level, respectively.   
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Hiring Standards -0.0122** -0.0362** -0.0035** -0.0074**




At Work Standards -0.0325** -0.1169** -0.0080** -0.0163**




Firing Standards 0.0079** -0.0037 0.0037** 0.0113**




No. of Observations 2624 2624 2624 2624 2624 2624 2624 2624 2624 2624 2624 2624
LR chi2 2196.10 2223.64 2194.82 2199.70 2257.80 2197.01 2723.77 2759.93 2736.79 2725.95 2767.45 2760.30
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.2802 0.2837 0.2800 0.2806 0.2881 0.2803 0.7144 0.7239 0.7178 0.7150 0.7259 0.7240
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Hiring Standards -0.0039 0.0169 -0.0168** -0.0284**




At Work Standards -0.0217** -0.1010** -0.0097** -0.0383**




Firing Standards 0.0172** 0.0507** -0.0006 0.0120**




No. of Observations 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640
LR chi2 895.64 905.66 912.11 897.21 923.02 922.03 1242.33 1166.43 1126.01 1255.34 1213.92 1149.20
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.3072 0.3106 0.3128 0.3077 0.3166 0.3162 0.8665 0.8135 0.7853 0.8755 0.8466 0.8015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Hiring Standards -0.0246** -0.0400** -0.0022** -0.0013




At Work Standards -0.0539** -0.0640** -0.0039** 0.0092**




Firing Standards -0.0217** -0.0292 0.0012 0.0310**




No. of Observations 1984 1984 1984 1984 1984 1984 1984 1984 1984 1984 1984 1984
LR chi2 1181.44 1213.70 1178.28 1182.09 1213.87 1178.43 1346.48 1351.81 1343.96 1346.59 1364.11 1387.18
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.2716 0.2790 0.2709 0.2717 0.2790 0.2709 0.7897 0.7929 0.7882 0.7898 0.8001 0.8136
Labor Market             
Flexibility Indicator
Labor Market             
Flexibility Indicator
Labor Market             
Flexibility Indicator
Panel C.  Developing Countries
Japan US
Panel A.  All Countries
Panel B.  Developed Countries30 
 
Panel B reveals that hiring standards are insignificant for Japanese MNCs when they 
choose to invest in developed countries, but at work and firing standards are important for 
them.  In particular, an increase in at work standards decreases FDI inflows from Japan, but 
an increase in firing standards increases FDI inflows from Japan.  Meanwhile, US MNCs are 
sensitive to all labor market standards in developed countries.  An increase in both hiring and 
at work standards decreases FDI inflows from US, but an increase in firing standards 
increases FDI inflows.   
Panel C reveals that Japanese MNCs are sensitive to all labor market standards in 
developing countries.  Japanese MNCs are most sensitive to at work standards in developing 
countries, such that a 10 unit increase in at work index will decrease FDI inflows by about 54 
64 percent, as seen in columns (2) and (5).  Firing standards, meanwhile, exert the least 
impact   a 10 unit increase in firing index will decrease FDI inflows by about 22 percent, as  
seen in column (3).  Similarly, US MNCs are sensitive to all labor market standards in 
developing countries.  A 10 unit increase in hiring index will decrease FDI inflows by only 
about 2 percent.  A non linear relationship, meanwhile, is found for both at work and firing 
standards.  A 10 unit increase in at work and firing indexes will increase FDI inflows by about 
9 and 31 percent, respectively.  This positive effect, however, has a limit.  Developing 
countries with at work and firing indexes beyond 23 and 20, respectively, may experience a 
decline in US FDI inflows if they further increase their at work and firing standards.  Of the 
124 developing countries considered, 89 countries have at work index below 23 and 108 
countries have firing index below 20.  This implies that most developing countries can further 




Table 2B.  Impact of Labor Market Regulations on FDI Inflows from Japan and US 
 
Notes:  Values in ( ) are standards errors.  ** and * indicate significance at 5% and 10% level, respectively.   
 
Similar to ILO indexes, Table 2B, Panel A reveals that WB indexes are significant 
determinants of FDI inflows from Japan and US, implying that investors from both countries 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Rigidity of Employment -0.0185** -0.1307** -0.0062** -0.0618**




Difficulty of Hiring -0.0011 -0.0504** -0.0005 -0.0176**




Rigidity of Hours -0.0329** -0.0786** -0.0113** -0.0397**




Difficulty of Firing 0.0018 -0.0279** -0.0006** -0.0147**




No. of Observations 2624 2624 2624 2624 2624 2624 2624 2624 2624 2624 2624 2624 2624 2624 2624 2624
LR chi2 2205.65 2191.29 2270.16 2191.40 2258.82 2225.26 2293.08 2198.95 2751.59 2715.49 2909.36 2715.55 3062.29 2789.80 3115.12 2752.06
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.2814 0.2796 0.2896 0.2796 0.2882 0.2839 0.2926 0.2806 0.7217 0.7123 0.7631 0.7123 0.8032 0.7317 0.8171 0.7218
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Rigidity of Employment -0.0259** -0.0844** -0.0082** -0.0491**




Difficulty of Hiring -0.0126** -0.0500** -0.0043** -0.0094**




Rigidity of Hours -0.0318** -0.0845** -0.0089** -0.0392**




Difficulty of Firing -0.0023 -0.0243** -0.0021 -0.0208**




No. of Observations 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640 640
LR chi2 914.62 905.04 938.97 895.44 922.96 911.44 962.99 897.08 1161.11 1145.35 1190.45 1128.40 1240.34 1147.68 1357.07 1145.85
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.3137 0.3104 0.3220 0.3071 0.3165 0.3126 0.3303 0.3077 0.8098 0.7988 0.8303 0.7870 0.8651 0.8004 0.9465 0.7992
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Rigidity of Employment -0.0183** -0.1848** -0.0017 -0.0657**




Difficulty of Hiring -0.0006 -0.0545** 0.0017** -0.0118**




Rigidity of Hours -0.0424** -0.1035** -0.0097** -0.0380**




Difficulty of Firing 0.0064 0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0066**




No. of Observations 1984 1984 1984 1984 1984 1984 1984 1984 1984 1984 1984 1984 1984 1984 1984 1984
LR chi2 1177.50 1170.50 1233.13 1172.38 1227.14 1194.84 1249.57 1172.57 1345.35 1349.52 1408.16 1343.51 1581.52 1402.57 1484.85 1350.50
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.2707 0.2691 0.2835 0.2695 0.2821 0.2747 0.2872 0.2695 0.7891 0.7915 0.8259 0.7880 0.9276 0.8226 0.8709 0.7921
Labor Market                
Flexibility Indicator
Labor Market                
Flexibility Indicator
Labor Market                
Flexibility Indicator
Panel C.  Developing Countries
Japan US
Panel A.  All Countries
Panel B.  Developed Countries32 
 
are sensitive to labor market regulations.  In general, countries with higher labor market 
regulations receive fewer FDI from Japan and US.  Results likewise reveal that Japanese 
MNCs are more sensitive to regulations than US MNCs, as implied by the larger magnitude 
of the coefficients of the indexes for the case of Japan.  For both countries, it is evident there 
is a non linear relationship between labor market regulations and FDI inflows, and that firing 
regulations exert the least impact among the labor market regulations considered.   
Panels B and C similarly show that Japanese MNCs are in general more sensitive to 
labor market regulations than US MNCs, except for firing regulations in developing countries.  
Firing regulations are insignificant for Japanese FDI inflows to developing countries.  
However, a 10 unit increase in the firing index reduces US FDI inflows to developing 
countries by about 6 percent.   
The foregoing suggests that investors from different countries have different 
preferences for different labor market standards and regulations.  In general, Japanese MNCs 
are more sensitive to labor market standards and regulations than US MNCs.  This finding is 
consistent with the conclusion of Lee (2003).   MNCs from both countries are likewise more 
negatively affected by hiring and work hour regulations than firing regulations in both 
developed and developing countries.  Firing standards and regulations have the least negative 
impact on FDI inflows.  Firing standards even exert a positive impact on US FDI inflows to 
all countries.   
Next, I consider the possibility that the impact of labor market flexibility on FDI 
inflows varies per sector.  Tables 3A and 3B present estimations for manufacturing
20 and non 
manufacturing
21 FDI inflows from Japan and United States.
22   
                                                 
20 Manufacturing sector includes production of food, textile, lumber and pulp, chemical, metal, machinery, 
electrical, and transport.  33 
 
Table 3A.  Impact of Labor Market Standards on FDI Inflows from Japan and US, by Sector 
                            
 
Notes:  Values in ( ) are standards errors.  ** and * indicate significance at 5% and 10% level, respectively.   
 
Table 3A, Panel A reveals that Japanese FDI inflows to the manufacturing sector are 
very sensitive to both hiring and firing standards, but insensitive to at work standards.  An 
increase in hiring standards decreases FDI inflows and an increase in firing standards 
increases FDI inflows as seen in columns (1), (4), and (6).  Panel B shows that Japanese FDI 
inflows to the non manufacturing sector, meanwhile, are very sensitive to all labor market 
                                                                                                                                                         
21 Non manufacturing sector includes farming and forestry, fishery, mining, construction, trade, finance and 
insurance, service, transportation, real estate, professional, scientific, and technical services, and information.   
22 A caveat to these estimations is that not all countries have reported breakdown of manufacturing and non 
manufacturing FDI inflows.  Countries with positive values of FDI inflows are therefore those countries which 
reported a breakdown, but this may not necessarily mean that those with zero FDI inflows did not actually have 
FDI inflows.   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Hiring Standards -0.0241** -0.0904** 0.0153** 0.0404**




At Work Standards -0.0029 0.0457 -0.0068 0.0012




Firing Standards -0.0485** 0.1175** 0.0075** -0.0055




No. of Observations 2290 2290 2290 2290 2290 2290 2290 2290 2290 2290 2290 2290
LR chi2 1422.89 1417.21 1450.51 1431.37 1419.53 1480.50 2293.91 2284.04 2287.51 2299.98 2284.52 2291.97
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.4535 0.4516 0.4623 0.4562 0.4524 0.4719 0.4068 0.4051 0.4057 0.4079 0.4052 0.4065
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Hiring Standards -0.0407** -0.1108** -0.0042 0.0200**




At Work Standards -0.0269** -0.0098 -0.0028 0.0322**




Firing Standards -0.0890** 0.0551 0.0077** 0.0057




No. of Observations 2291 2291 2291 2291 2291 2291 2291 2291 2291 2291 2291 2291
LR chi2 1210.55 1203.22 1267.75 1217.12 1203.46 1282.33 2385.02 2384.40 2391.30 2391.96 2395.19 2391.43
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.3655 0.3643 0.3838 0.3685 0.3644 0.3883 0.4241 0.4240 0.4252 0.4253 0.4259 0.4252
Labor Market             
Flexibility Indicator
Labor Market             
Flexibility Indicator
Panel B.  Non-Manufacturing FDI
Panel A.  Manufacturing FDI
Japan US34 
 
standards.  In general, higher labor market standards decreases Japanese FDI inflows to the 
non manufacturing sector.   The results for US FDI inflows to the manufacturing and non 
manufacturing sectors reveal quite a different picture. In contrast to Japanese FDI, US FDI 
inflows to both sectors are in general positively affected by labor market standards.  The only 
exception is that at work standards are insignificant for US manufacturing FDI.  
 
Table 3B.  Impact of Labor Market Regulations on FDI Inflows from Japan and US, 
                          by Sector 
 
 
Notes:  Values in ( ) are standards errors.  ** and * indicate significance at 5% and 10% level, respectively.   
 
Table 3B reveals that both manufacturing and non manufacturing FDI inflows from 
both Japan and US are negatively affected by regulations.  It is likewise noteworthy that a 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Rigidity of Employment -0.0268** -0.0104 -0.0161** -0.0614**




Difficulty of Hiring -0.0092* -0.0360** -0.0002 -0.0125




Rigidity of Hours -0.0171** -0.0718** -0.0138** -0.0717**




Difficulty of Firing -0.0115* -0.1140** -0.0150** -0.0170*




No. of Observations 2290 2290 2290 2290 2290 2290 2290 2290 2290 2290 2290 2290 2290 2290 2290 2290
LR chi2 1425.66 1419.90 1423.61 1420.30 1425.96 1423.88 1431.45 1459.35 2298.06 2281.79 2299.16 2308.64 2309.10 2248.58 2345.64 2308.69
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.4544 0.4526 0.4537 0.4527 0.4545 0.4538 0.4562 0.4651 0.4076 0.4047 0.4078 0.4094 0.4095 0.4052 0.4160 0.4094
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Rigidity of Employment 0.0165 -0.1924** 0.0024 -0.0725**




Difficulty of Hiring 0.0080 -0.1007** 0.0027 -0.0129*




Rigidity of Hours -0.0074 -0.1267** -0.0012 -0.0597**




Difficulty of Firing 0.0186** -0.0163** 0.0012 -0.0201**




No. of Observations 2291 2291 2291 2291 2291 2291 2291 2291 2291 2291 2291 2291 2291 2291 2291 2291
LR chi2 1201.39 1200.44 1199.69 1205.84 1241.18 1244.29 1226.30 1296.50 2384.36 2385.34 2384.11 2384.14 2421.83 2390.84 2440.76 2391.24
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.3638 0.3635 0.3632 0.3651 0.3758 0.3767 0.3713 0.3926 0.4239 0.4241 0.4239 0.4239 0.4306 0.4251 0.4340 0.4252
Labor Market                
Flexibility Indicator
Labor Market                
Flexibility Indicator
Panel B.  Non-Manufacturing FDI
Japan US
Panel A.  Manufacturing FDI35 
 
non linear relationship between labor market regulations and FDI inflows exist.     The 
implications of these results for the case of US FDI inflows are very similar to what is 
suggested by the findings in Tables 1A and 1B.  In particular, while US MNCs invest more in 
countries with higher labor standards, regulations have a greater tendency of reducing US FDI 
inflows.  This implies that US foreign investors prefer to invest in countries with some degree 
of labor market standards as these may signal higher aggregate labor productivity, but they 
may be wary of some labor market regulations because these translate to actual costs.   
Though results show that both manufacturing and non manufacturing FDI inflows are 
sensitive to labor market standards and regulations, the impact of the latter on the former 
varies, depending on the standard or regulation considered.  The difference in the impact of 
standards and regulations on US and Japanese FDI may be explained by the fact that FDI 
from the two countries go in different specific sectors and that different sectors have varying 
degrees of sensitivities to different labor market standards and regulations.  The bulk of 
Japanese non manufacturing FDI goes into service (professional, scientific, technical, 
information services) (31%), real estate (27%), and finance
23 and insurance (18%), while 
majority of US non manufacturing FDI goes into finance
24 (45%), petroleum (16%), and 
wholesale trade (14%).  Greater proportion of Japanese manufacturing FDI goes into 
electrical (38%), chemical (15%), and transport (11%), while majority of US manufacturing 







                                                 
23 Including banking institutions 
24 Excluding banking institutions 
25 These figures are based on average US and Japanese outbound FDI from 1990 2003.   36 
 
VI.  Robustness Check 
 
  Several robustness checks were performed to verify the results in the preceding 
section.  These estimations are displayed in Tables 4 6.   
 
Table 4.  Robustness Check – Coefficients of Wage and Wage
2 Excluding LMF Indicators 
 
                             Notes:  Values in ( ) are standards errors.  ** and * indicate significance at 5% and 10% 
    level, respectively.   The same explanatory variables that appear in Appendix  
    Table 7 are used in the estimations, but are not shown for brevity purposes.   
 
First, though the correlation between wage and the different labor market flexibility 
indicators do not suggest a high level of correlation as seen in Appendix Table 8, I recognize 
the possibility that the labor market indicators may just be capturing the effect of wages or 
vice versa.  Table 4 contains the coefficients of wage and wage
2 in estimations excluding any 
labor market flexibility indicator.  Coefficients in Panel A are estimated using fixed effects 
estimation, while coefficients in Panel B are estimated using ordinary least squares.  These 
coefficients can then be compared to the coefficients of wage and wage
2 in Appendix Tables 
7A and 7B, where labor market flexibility indicators are included in the estimations.  The 
coefficients of wage and wage
2 displayed in Table 4, Panels A and B are similar to the 
All Countries Developed Countries Developing Countries
Wage 0.0056 0.2478* -0.0196
(0.048) (0.147) (0.053)
(Wage)
2 0.0029 -0.0121 0.0044
(0.003) (0.010) (0.003)
All Countries Developed Countries Developing Countries
Wage 0.0624** 0.1203* 0.0644**
(0.023) (0.066) (0.024)
(Wage)
2 -0.0032* 0.0042 -0.0040**
(0.001) (0.007) (0.001)
Panel A.  Without LMF, FE
Panel B.  Without LMF, OLS37 
 
coefficients in Appendix Tables 7A and 7B, respectively.
26  This dismisses the possibility that 
the labor market flexibility indicators are capturing the effects of wages.   
 
Table 5.  Robustness Check – Including All LMF Indicators in a Single Estimation 
 
 
                                 Notes:  Values in ( ) are standards errors.  ** and * indicate significance at 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
                                             The same explanatory variables that appear in Appendix Tables 7A and 7B are used in the                                              
             estimations, but are not shown for brevity purposes.   
 
Second, instead of adding the labor market indicators one by one, I included the 
indicators in a single estimation.  Results are displayed in Table 5.   Panel A adds the ILO 
indexes in a single estimation and Panel B adds the WB indexes in a single estimation.  
Comparing these with the coefficients of the ILO and WB indicators in Tables 1A and 1B, 
                                                 
26 An exception is that the coefficient of wage becomes insignificant when at work indexes are included in the 
estimations for developed countries, as seen in Appendix Table 7A, Panel B, columns (2) and (5).  In addition, 
the coefficient of wage becomes insignificant when WB indicators enter non linearly in the estimations for 
developed countries, as seen in Appendix Table 7B, Panel B, columns (5) (8).   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Hiring Standards 0.0008 0.0050 0.0042 0.0123 -0.0005 0.0015
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.003) (0.006)
(Hiring Standards)
2 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
At Work Standards 0.0137** 0.0056 0.0134** 0.0113 0.0139** 0.0055
(0.003) (0.009) (0.006) (0.022) (0.004) (0.011)
(At Work Standards)
2 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firing Standards 0.0008 0.0013 -0.0002 -0.0045 0.0016 0.0121**
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005)
(Firing Standards)
2 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No. of Observations 2640 2640 656 656 1984 1984
F-statistic 17.11 15.85 10.26 9.53 11.30 10.57
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.2067 0.2072 0.3965 0.3988 0.1873 0.1893
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Difficulty of Hiring 0.0010 0.0009 0.0027* 0.0046 -0.0013* -0.0035*
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.001)
(Difficulty of Hiring)
2 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Rigidity of Hours 0.0024** 0.0031 -0.0020 -0.0466** 0.0024** 0.0155**
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002)
(Rigidity of Hours)
2 -0.0001 0.0005** -0.0001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Difficulty of Firing -0.0033** -0.0062** -0.0040** 0.0038 -0.0040** -0.0096**
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.000) (0.002)
(Difficulty of Firing)
2 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No. of Observations 2640 2640 656 656 1984 1984
F-statistic 37.54 36.31 47.91 50.66 26.90 25.99
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.3205 0.3210 0.6448 0.6994 0.2721 0.2836
Panel A.  Labor Market Standards
Panel B.  Labor Market Regulations
All Countries Developed Countries Developing Countries
All Countries Developed Countries Developing Countries38 
 




Table 6.  Robustness Check – Impact of Labor Market Flexibility in Low and High Rigidity 
     Countries 
 
 
Notes:  Values in ( ) are standards errors.  ** and * indicate significance at 5% and 10% level, respectively. The same explanatory variables that  
             appear in Appendix Tables 7A and 7B are used in the estimations, but are not shown for brevity purposes.   
 
Third, I divide the sample of countries into low and high rigidity countries.  Countries 
with below average labor market indexes are considered to have less rigid labor markets, 
                                                 
27 The only exception is that hiring standards loses significance in Table 5.  This can be explained by the high 
correlation between hiring and at work standards as seen in Appendix Table 8.   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Hiring Standards 0.0144** 0.0394 -0.0117 -0.0289*




At Work Standards 0.0295** -0.0077 0.0065 -0.0730




Firing Standards 0.0001 -0.0011 -0.0032 -0.0178**




No. of Observations 1199 1554 1552 1199 1554 1552 1432 1077 1079 1432 1077 1079
F-statistic 6.82 8.62 7.62 6.62 8.50 7.62 10.79 11.83 12.93 10.52 11.61 12.78
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.1819 0.1721 0.1552 0.1820 0.1743 0.1552 0.2265 0.2932 0.3121 0.2272 0.2955 0.3161
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Rigidity of Employment 0.0016 -0.0182** 0.0066** -0.1002**




Difficulty of Hiring -0.0015 -0.0140** 0.0014 0.0110




Rigidity of Hours 0.0129** 0.0010 0.0005 -0.0293*




Difficulty of Firing -0.0053** 0.0463** 0.0003 -0.0078




No. of Observations 1320 1197 878 1417 1320 1197 878 1417 1311 1434 1753 1214 1311 1434 1753 1214
F-statistic 21.13 19.99 32.46 27.65 21.65 19.95 32.46 28.66 19.30 20.80 23.31 18.17 19.96 20.47 22.85 17.68
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.2719 0.3209 0.4230 0.3221 0.2744 0.3224 0.4230 0.3504 0.3940 0.3775 0.3286 0.3813 0.4039 0.3782 0.3303 0.3814
Labor Market          Flexibility 
Indicator
Labor Market          Flexibility 
Indicator
Panel A. Labor Market Standards
Panel B. Labor Market Regulations
Low Rigidity High Rigidity
Low Rigidity High Rigidity39 
 
while those with above average are considered to have more rigid labor markets.  Results are 
shown in Table 6.  Panel A, columns (1) and (2) reveal that countries classified under low 
rigidity will have increasing FDI inflows as hiring and at work standards increase.  Firing 
standards are insignificant for low rigidity countries.  Countries classified under high rigidity  
will have decreasing FDI inflows as hiring and firing standards increase, as seen in Panel A, 
columns (12) and (14).  At work standards are insignificant for high rigidity countries.  These 
suggest that countries with few labor market standards can still increase their standards and 
attract more FDI.  However, for countries with already high labor market standards, 
increasing standards any further will deter FDI inflows.  These confirm earlier results.   
Panel B shows that as hiring regulations increase in low rigidity countries, FDI inflows will 
decrease as seen in columns (6), but as work hour and firing regulations increase, FDI inflows 
will increase, as seen in columns (3) and (8), respectively.  Meanwhile, as work hour 
regulations increase in high rigidity countries, FDI inflows will decrease as seen in column 
(15), but both hiring and firing regulations are insignificant as displayed in columns (10), 
(12), (14), and (16).  Comparing these results to the developed and developing countries 
samples in Tables 1A and 1B shows no discernable pattern, suggesting that countries 
classified under low (high) rigidity countries are not necessarily developed (developing) 
countries.   
Finally, I accounted for other market regulations that may be considered important by 
MNCs in choosing FDI host countries.  In particular, I included variables that may capture the 
cost of market regulations, namely, the cost of starting a business, cost of registering a 
property, legal rights of a business, investor protection, and cost of implementing a contract.
28  
Some of these variables are highly correlated with each other.  For instance, investor 
                                                 
28 These are from the Doing Business Survey of the World Bank. 40 
 
protection is highly correlated with legal rights of a business, and cost of a contract is highly 
correlated with the cost of starting a business.  Thus, I did not include highly correlated 
variables in a single estimation.  Some of these variables are likewise highly correlated with 
the labor market flexibility indexes.  For instance, legal rights of a business is highly 
correlated with the rigidity of employment index
29, and investor protection is highly 
correlated with the rigidity of hours and difficulty of firing index
30.  In such cases, I excluded 
the market regulation that is highly correlated with a labor market flexibility indicator. Results 
show that the other market regulations are not statistically significant in explaining 
differences in FDI inflows to countries coming from the rest of the world.  A possible 
explanation for this is that the variables considered are highly correlated with the real GDP 
per capita, which is already included in the estimations.
31   
 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
 
This study has made a number of significant contributions to our understanding of the 
labor market flexibility–FDI inflows literature.  First, using a simple model, this study was 
able to reconcile the contrasting findings of previous studies.  On the one hand, labor market 
regulations and standards decrease FDI inflows through the cost channel by increasing the 
total variable cost faced by a firm when it needs to make an adjustment in its employment 
level due to market uncertainties.  On the other hand, labor market regulations and standards 
increase FDI inflows through the productivity channel by decreasing the marginal cost of 
production faced by a firm.   
                                                 
29 Countries with high degree of legal rights have low rigidity of employment index. 
30 Countries with high degree of investor protection have low rigidity of hours and difficulty of firing indexes.  
31 Average correlation coefficient between GDP per capita and various regulations is 0.50. 41 
 
Second, in contrast to existing studies that have assumed a simple linear relationship, 
this study has shown that it is important to account for non linear relationship between labor 
market flexibility and FDI inflows.  Allowing for a non linear relationship revealed that some 
degree of labor market standards and regulations may be attractive for foreign investors as 
this may signal better labor relations and higher labor productivity.  There is evidence that the 
negative impact of some labor market standards and regulations may only manifest itself at 
higher levels of standards and regulations.  This result is important especially for developing 
countries that want to attract more FDI inflows.  In particular, there is no solid evidence that 
developing countries should “race to the bottom” in order to attract more FDI.  What is 
needed is a proper balance of labor market regulations that will enhance labor productivity, 
but at the same time will not be too costly from the point of view of MNCs.   
Third, in contrast to previous studies that have used a single aggregated index, this 
study used disaggregated labor market indicators to investigate the FDI labor market 
flexibility relationship.  Results strongly suggest that it is important to disaggregate the 
different aspects of labor market standards and regulations as foreign investors respond 
differently to them.   
Fourth, the use of ILO indexes as indicators of labor market standards and WB 
indexes as indicators of labor market regulations has shown that it is important to distinguish 
between labor market standards and regulations.  In general, FDI inflows increase in countries 
with higher labor market standards, but decrease in countries with higher labor market 
regulations.  These suggest that countries should be cautious in formulating regulations to 
implement standards.  While the existence of labor market standards may be attractive to 
foreign investors as they signal higher labor productivity, the way they are implemented is 
likewise important, as they can be costly from the point of view of firms.   42 
 
Finally, this study has shown that Japanese and US MNCs respond differently to labor 
market standards and regulations.  In particular, Japanese MNCs are more sensitive to most 
labor market standards and regulations, such that FDI inflows from Japan decrease as labor 
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              Appendix Table 1.  ILO Conventions on 
                          Hiring, At Work, and Firing Standards 
 
 














Minimum Age  138
Minimum Age (Industry) 59
Minimum Age (Non Industrial Employment) 33
Minimum Age (Underground Work) 123
Part Time Work 175
Minimum Wage Fixing 131
Minimum Wage Fixing (Agriculture) 99
Maintenance of Social Security Rights 157
Medical Care and Sickness Benefits 130
At Work 
Forty Hour Week 47
Hours of Work (Commerce and Offices) 30
Hours of Work (Industry) 1
Weekly Rest (Commerce and Offices) 106
Weekly Rest (Industry) 14
Holidays with Pay 52,132
Holidays with Pay (Agriculture) 101
Paid Education Leave 140
Protection of Wages 95
Night Work 171
Night Work of Young Persons (Industry) 6, 90
Night Work of Young Persons (Non Industrial Occupations) 79
Night Work (Women) 89
Employment Injury Benefits 121
Occupational Safety and Health 155
Occupational Health Services 161
Prevention of Major Industrial Accidents 174
Maternity Protection 103
Invalidity, Old Age, and Survivors’ Benefits       128
Firing 
Employment Promotion and Protection Against Unemployment 168
Protection of workers’ Claims (Employer’s Insolvency) 173















Appendix Table 3. Summary of Labor Market Indicators  










Difficulty of Hiring Index (DHI)
whether term contracts can be used only for temporary tasks
maximum duration of term contracts
ratio of mandated minimum wage to the average value added per worker
Rigidity of Hours Index (RHI)
whether night work is unrestricted
whether weekend work is allowed
whether the workweek can consist of 5.5 days
whether the workday can extend to 12 hours or more (including overtime)
the annual paid vacation days are 21 or fewer
Difficulty of Firing Index Index (DFI)
whether redundancy is not considered fair grounds for dismissal
whether the employer needs to notify the labor union or the labor ministry to fire 1 redundant worker
whether the employer needs to notify the labor union or the labor ministry for group dismissals
whether the employer needs approval from the labor union or the labor ministry for firing 1 redundant worker
whether the employer needs approval from the labor union or the labor ministry for group dismissals
whether the law mandates training or replacement before dismissal
whether priority rules apply for dismissals
whether priority rules apply for reemployment
With ILO Conventions Hiring At Work Firing Hiring At Work Firing
Above the mean 69% 56% 71% 64% 40% 38%
Below the mean 31% 44% 29% 36% 60% 62%
Developed Countries Countries Developing Countries
With WB Indicators REI DHI RHI DFI REI DHI RHI DFI
Above the mean 46% 41% 68% 39% 51% 59% 33% 48%
Below the mean 54% 59% 32% 61% 49% 41% 64% 52%46 
 













     Hiring  0.0475
     At Work  0.1692
     Firing  0.3990
WB Indicators
     Rigidity of Employment 0.1923
     Difficulty of Hiring 0.1426
     Rigidity of Hours 0.0303
     Difficulty of Firing 0.1162
Labor Market Indicator Developing Country Dummy (=1)
FDI Inflows  Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment from the Rest of the World www.unctad.org
Japanese FDI Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment from Japan http://www.mof.go.jp
US FDI Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment from US http://www.bea.gov/international
Wage Monthly wage in US$ www.ilo.org
GDP per capita GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $)  World Development Indicators
Inflation Annual Inflation Rate World Development Indicators
Trade Trade in goods and services (% of GDP)  World Development Indicators
Tax Taxes on goods and services (% of revenue)  World Development Indicators
Labor Force Participation % of total population ages 15 64 in the labor force  World Development Indicators
Literacy Rate Total adult literacy rate (% of people ages 15 and above)  www.unesco.org
Population Population ages 15 64 World Development Indicators
Exchange Rate Local Currency Unit per US$, period average World Development Indicators
External Debt External debt (% of GDP) World Development Indicators
Corruption Index
Index ranges from  2.5 to 2.5, with  2.5 and 2.5 indicating the 
least and most corrupt government
World Governance Indicators
Capital Openness Index
Index ranges from 0 1, with 0 and 1 indicating the most and least 
capital account restrictions , respectively,
Chinn and Ito (2006)
Manufacturing Value Added Manufacturing, value added (constant 2000 US$)  World Development Indicators
Distance from US




Great circle distance between Tokyo, Japan and Country's 
Capital (km)
http://www.indo.com/distance/
Dummy for Democratic Country Dummy=1 if democratic country; 0, otherwise World Factbook
Dummies for Preferential Trading 
Agreement
Dummy=1 if member of PTA; 0, otherwise (PTAs considered are 
AFTA, NAFTA, EU, MERCOSUR, CARICOM, COMESA)
www.wto.org
Variable Description Source47 
 









FDI Inflows (% of GDP) 6.92 38.88 0 523.37
Japanese FDI, Total (in log) 1.53 2.51 0 10.55
Japanese FDI, Manufacturing (in log) 0.58 1.71 0 9.16
Japanese FDI, Non Manufacturing 0.59 1.74 0 10.25
US FDI, Total (in log) 8.99 0.47 7.72 9.70
US FDI, Manufacturing (in log) 1.01 1.61 0 5.13
US FDI, Non Manufacturing (in log) 0.97 1.55 0 4.59
Wage (in log) 5.93 1.83 0 14.79
Hiring Index 18.17 14.77 0 66.67
At Work Index 19.58 15.63 0 66.67
Firing Index 13.24 19.34 0 100
Rigidity of Employment 34.03 17.88 0 74
Difficulty of Hiring 31.88 26.55 0 100
Rigidity of Hours 39.15 22.28 0 80
Difficulty of Firing 31.09 21.80 0 80
GDP per capita 7933 8804 170.55 53582
Inflation 57.29 565.42 0 23773
Trade (% of GDP) 85.28 50.55 10.83 456.08
Taxes on Goods and Services (% of GDP) 29.28 12.79 0.69 79.45
Labor Force Participation Rate 69.73 8.91 46.07 93.12
Literacy Rate 78.36 22.05 11.40 100
Population (in log) 15.62 1.94 10.59 20.98
Exchange Rate (in log) 3.00 3.07  19.84 14.22
External Debt (% of GDP) 1.40 18.03 0 548.15
Corruption Index  0.01 1.00  2.09 2.49
Manufacturing Value Added 20.87 2.79 11.62 28.15
Distance from US (in log) 8.99 0.47 7.72 9.70
Distance from Japan (in log) 9.16 0.42 7.05 9.8248 
 
Appendix Table 7A.  Impact of Other Explanatory Variables on FDI Inflows  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Wage 0.0035 -0.0084 0.0013 0.0030 -0.0085 -0.0009 0.2904** 0.1915 0.2441* 0.3134** 0.1921 0.2468* -0.0212 -0.0259 -0.0250 -0.0235 -0.0258 -0.0312
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.147) (0.146) (0.147) (0.148) (0.146) (0.148) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
(Wage)
2 0.0033 0.0041 0.0031 0.0034 0.0040 0.0032 -0.0139 -0.0085 -0.0120 -0.0153 -0.0085 -0.0121 0.0048 0.0054 0.0047 0.0049 0.0052 0.0053
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
GDP per capita 1.7031** 1.6794** 1.7954** 1.7002** 1.6886** 1.7642** 1.1021** 1.3798** 1.0797** 1.0365** 1.3459** 0.2326** 3.0341** 2.9907** 3.0849** 3.0376** 2.9905** 2.9537**
(0.622) (0.620) (0.622) (0.623) (0.620) (0.623) (0.451) (0.437) (0.405) (0.451) (0.445) (0.425) (0.836) (0.833) (0.835) (0.836) (0.833) (0.837)
(GDP per capita)
2 -0.1079** -0.1036** -0.1140** -0.1076** -0.1042** -0.1118** -0.0518 -0.0641 -0.0047 -0.0469 -0.0623 -0.0123 -0.1946** -0.1896** -0.1979** -0.1947** -0.1896** -0.1888**
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.216) (0.216) (0.219) (0.216) (0.216) (0.222) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
Inflation Rate -0.0224 -0.0232* -0.0214 -0.0221 -0.0227* -0.0214 0.0335 0.0289 0.0336 0.0372 0.0290 0.0333 -0.0352** -0.0357** -0.0347** -0.0351** -0.0347** -0.0336**
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) -0.04 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Trade 0.4087** 0.3924** 0.4146** 0.4062** 0.3905** 0.4144** 0.3539** 0.3903** 0.3770** 0.3652** 0.3929** 0.3714** 0.3917** 0.3705** 0.03950** 0.3877** 0.3679** 0.3867**
(0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.157) (0.157) (0.159) (0.158) (0.158) (0.161) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069)
Tax -0.0707 -0.0704 -0.0629 -0.0720 -0.0670 -0.0619 -0.1001 -0.0980 -0.1435 -0.1127 -0.1006 -0.1470 -0.0372 -0.0419 -0.0285 -0.0387** -0.0387** -0.0257**
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.151) (0.151) (0.152) (0.152) (0.508) (0.153) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072)
LFP Rate -0.4528 -0.2719 -0.4633 -0.4390 -0.3052 -0.4350 -0.7826 -0.5439 -0.4180* -0.8274 -0.5356 -1.4471 -0.2300 -0.1013 -0.1149 -0.1860 -0.1496 -0.0881
(0.394) (0.395) (0.396) (0.394) (0.399) (0.397) (0.805) (0.812) (0.782) (0.807) (0.814) (0.792) (0.475) (0.474) (0.481) (0.477) (0.480) (0.480)
Literacy Rate 0.4010 0.2997 0.4205 0.3872 0.2999 0.4160 3.0753 3.0862 1.0009 2.4714 3.1132 0.7896 0.3431 0.2248 0.3359 0.3394 0.2239 0.3284
(0.269) (0.269) (0.269) (0.269) (0.269) (0.123) (2.419) (2.371) (2.384) (2.494) (2.379) (2.539) (0.297) (0.298) (0.297) (0.297) (0.298) (0.297)
Population -0.2371 -0.1336 -0.2521 -0.2452 -0.1241 -0.2464 0.1514 0.2775 0.0382 0.0805 0.2798 0.0603 -0.1236 -0.0556 -0.1451 -0.1260 -0.0424 -0.1343
(0.237) (0.238) (0.238) (0.238) (0.239) (0.238) (0.421) (0.425) (0.424) (0.427) (0.425) (0.434) (0.313) (0.312) (0.312) (0.313) (0.313) (0.312)
Exchange Rate 0.0238** 0.0224** 0.0231** 0.0240** 0.0223** 0.0233** 0.1643* 0.1051* 0.1151* 0.1567** 0.1020 0.1188 0.0236** 0.0226** 0.0239** 0.0239** 0.0223** 0.0256**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.018) (0.010) (0.010) (0.095) (0.094) (0.098) (0.095) (0.096) (0.099) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
KA Openness 0.0516** 0.0526** 0.0515** 0.0510** 0.0530** 0.0516** 0.0239 0.0198 0.0148 0.0236 0.0196 0.0149 0.0699** 0.0713** 0.0709** 0.0689** 0.0716** 0.0761**
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
External Debt 0.0081 0.0006 0.0095 0.0079 0.0006 0.0091 -0.0304 -0.0308 -0.0207 -0.0299 -0.0303 -0.0203 0.1552 0.1366 0.1522 0.1482 0.1340 0.1573
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118)
Corruption Index 0.0835** 0.0828** 0.0811** 0.0825** 0.0828** 0.0812** 0.0424 0.0895 0.0586 0.0075 0.0865 0.0570 0.0817** 0.0810** 0.0798** 0.0808** 0.0809** 0.0797**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.123) (0.122) (0.124) (0.128) (0.124) (0.124) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Democracy 0.0027 0.0050 0.0028 0.0026 0.0052 0.0028 0.0125 0.0280 0.0064 0.0098 0.0278 0.0053 0.0036 0.0054 0.0040 0.0033 0.0056 0.0035
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Panel A.  All Countries Panel B.  Developed Countries Panel C.  Developing Countries
 
Notes:  Columns in each panel correspond to columns in Table 1A.  Values in ( ) represent  standards errors.  ** and * indicate significance at 5% level and 10% level, respectively. Dummy variables for PTAs are 





Appendix Table 7B.  Impact of Other Explanatory Variables on FDI Inflows  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Wage 0.0634** 0.0647** 0.0648** 0.0668** 0.0554** 0.0648** 0.0644** 0.0669** 0.1249* 0.1182* 0.1288* 0.1112* 0.0456 0.1105 -0.0181 0.1176* 0.0684** 0.0678** 0.0694** 0.0753** 0.0635** 0.0679** 0.0477* 0.0779**
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.066) (0.068) (0.068) (0.066) (0.074) (0.070) (0.072) (0.067) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
(Wage)
2 -0.0033* -0.0034* -0.0035** -0.0036** -0.0027 -0.0034* -0.0035** -0.0036** 0.0039 0.0046 0.0040 0.0048 0.0096 0.0049 0.0147** 0.0045 -0.0041** -0.0041** -0.0043** -0.0047** -0.0036** -0.0041** -0.0028 -0.0050**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GDP per capita 2.0991** 2.0909** 2.1197** 2.0835** 2.0077** 2.0920** 2.1304** 2.1091** 2.4289** 1.8900** 3.1330** 2.6194** 3.1467** 1.7610** 2.9581** 1.9304** 0.8861** 0.9680** 0.9796** 0.7957* 0.8094* 0.9640** 1.1762** 0.8910**
(0.381) (0.377) (0.381) (0.383) (0.383) (0.379) (0.374) (0.380) (0.351) (0.354) (0.356) (0.355) (0.341) (0.357) (0.327) (0.345) (0.446) (0.451) (0.450) (0.444) (0.449) (0.451) (0.450) (0.442)
(GDP per capita)
2 -0.1256** -0.1253** -0.1268** -0.1242** -0.1201** -0.1254** -0.1274** -0.1257** -1.6983** -1.6697** -1.733** 1.7069** -1.7357** -1.6625** -1.5431** -1.6708** -0.0558** 0.0608** -0.0614** -0.0499* -0.0512* -0.0605** -0.0725** -0.0556**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.182) (0.183) (0.185) (0.184) (0.176) (0.185) (0.167) (0.178) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Inflation Rate -0.0211 -0.0214 -0.0263* -0.0199 -0.0218 -0.0214 -0.0256* -0.0197 -0.0618 -0.0619 -0.0594 -0.0705 -0.0902* -0.0640 -0.1185** -0.0512 -0.0421** -0.0448** -0.0470** -0.0434** -0.0421** -0.0447** -0.0379** -0.0415**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.050) (0.046) (0.053) (0.047) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Trade 0.7097** 0.7098** 0.7126** 0.7132** 0.6971** 0.7103** 0.7136** 0.7099** 0.7146** 0.7352** 0.7140** 0.7058** 0.7016** 0.7378** 0.6996** 0.7336** 0.5727** 0.5704** 0.5710** 0.5855** 0.5602** 0.5686** 0.5889** 0.5913**
(0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.067) (0.067) (0.065) (0.066) (0.069) (0.067) (0.067) (0.070) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.048)
Tax 0.0930** 0.0904** 0.0936** 0.0982** 0.1044** 0.0904** 0.0926** 0.1004** -0.1960** -0.2001** -0.1780** -0.2081** -0.0558 -0.1949** -0.0294 -0.2144** 0.1378** 0.1393** 0.1362** 0.1404** 0.1439** 0.1391** 0.1252** 0.1462**
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.053) (0.052) (0.061) (0.052) (0.063) (0.053) (0.057) (0.052) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
LFP Rate -0.2807* -0.2881* -0.3094* -0.3232* -0.3165* -0.2878* -0.3124* -0.3194* -3.1077** -3.012** -3.1900** -3.0697** -2.9035** -2.9579** -2.1963** -3.0827** 0.4791** 0.4635** 0.4085** 0.3804** 0.4582** 0.4640** 0.3520** 0.3801**
(0.172) (0.172) (0.174) (0.171) (0.173) (0.172) (0.172) (0.171) (0.485) (0.486) (0.488) (0.488) (0.461) (0.485) (0.415) (0.486) (0.157) (0.159) (0.162) (0.160) (0.158) (0.159) (0.158) (0.160)
Literacy Rate 0.2131** 0.2258** 0.2206** 0.1926** 0.2134** 0.2245** 0.2213** 0.1914** 0.7341 0.6941 0.4955 0.9754 0.6809 0.6965 0.7155 0.7859 0.2566** 0.2674** 0.2931** 0.2536** 0.2569** 0.2702** 0.2943** 0.2444**
(0.061) (0.062) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.062) (0.061) (0.061) (1.084) (1.064) (1.092) (1.129) (1.036) (1.071) (0.975) (1.119) (0.064) (0.064) (0.063) (0.063) (0.064) (0.065) (0.062) (0.063)
Population -0.0115 -0.0118 -0.0088 -0.0074 -0.0098 -0.0116 -0.0090 -0.0064 -0.1192** -0.1097** -0.1185** -0.1171** -0.0987** -0.1115** -0.0978** -0.1190** 0.0243** 0.0225** 0.0206* 0.0298** 0.0271** 0.0223** 0.0162 0.0323**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.0205) (0.027) (0.023) (0.027) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Exchange Rate 0.0028 0.0031 0.0047 0.0005 0.0010 0.0032 0.0046 0.0010 0.0117 0.0089 0.0147 0.0136 0.0274 0.0060 0.0249 0.0103 0.0009 0.0025** 0.0042 0.0011 0.0004 0.0023 0.0034 0.0015
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
KA Openness 0.0195 0.0198 0.0233* 0.0162 0.0168 0.0198 0.0241* 0.0149* 0.0250 0.0279 0.0253 0.0251 0.0028 0.0278 0.0735 0.0365 0.0323** 0.0352** 0.0364** 0.0314** 0.0313** 0.0352** 0.0441** 0.0302**
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
External Debt -0.0015** -0.0016** -0.0016** -0.0015** -0.0015** -0.0015** -0.0016** -0.0015** -0.0013** -0.0014** -0.0012** -0.0013** -0.0009** -0.0013** -0.0009** -0.0014** -0.0752** -0.0690** -0.0630** -0.0785** -0.0776** -0.0695** -0.0628** -0.0740**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Corruption Index 0.0161* 0.0151* 0.0161* 0.0167* 0.0148* 0.0151* 0.0170** 0.0160* 0.1540** 0.1517** 0.1640** 0.1431* 0.17770** 0.1540** 0.2301** 0.1307* 0.0038 0.0044 0.0036 0.0037 0.0029 0.0045 0.0048 0.0029
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.074) (0.074) (0.075) (0.074) (0.074) (0.038) (0.076) (0.073) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Democracy -0.0055 -0.0063 -0.0044 -0.0085 -0.0053 -0.0064 -0.0043 -0.0084 -0.0079 -0.0062 -0.0071 -0.0129 0.0123 0.0041 0.0073 0.0130 0.0049 0.0027 0.0032 0.0090 0.0047 0.0026 0.0035 0.0095
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.025) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Panel A.  All Countries Panel B.  Developed Countries Panel C.  Developing Countries
 
Notes:  Columns in each panel correspond to columns in Table 1B.  Values in ( ) represent  standards errors.  ** and * indicate significance at 5% level and 10% level, respectively. Dummy variables for PTAs are 






















Hiring Standards 0.0050 1.0000
At Work Standards 0.1184 0.5974 1.0000
Firing Standards 0.1788 0.3176 0.3176 1.0000
Rigidity of Employment  -0.1750 0.2371 0.3539 0.1367 1.0000
Difficulty of Hiring  -0.2143 0.1808 0.2574 0.1178 0.8075 1.0000
Rigidity of Hours  -0.0004 0.2079 0.4067 0.1286 0.7577 0.4282 1.0000

















Hiring Standards -0.1407 1.0000
At Work Standards -0.1503 0.7700 1.0000
Firing Standards 0.0897 0.4037 0.3255 1.0000
Rigidity of Employment  -0.2493 0.4663 0.6427 0.3515 1.0000
Difficulty of Hiring  -0.1264 0.4337 0.5969 0.3811 0.8296 1.0000
Rigidity of Hours  -0.2553 0.3874 0.6102 0.1314 0.8402 0.5064 1.0000

















Hiring Standards 0.0232 1.0000
At Work Standards 0.1323 0.5140 1.0000
Firing Standards 0.0136 0.2829 0.2339 1.0000
Rigidity of Employment  -0.1067 0.1572 0.2709 0.1288 1.0000
Difficulty of Hiring  -0.1642 0.1217 0.2049 0.1594 0.8023 1.0000
Rigidity of Hours  0.0397 0.1182 0.2855 0.0858 0.7536 0.4463 1.0000
Difficulty of Firing  -0.0850 0.1107 0.1133 0.0311 0.6702 0.2508 0.2934 1.0000
All Countries
Developed Country
Developing Country
 
 
 